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CASE SUMMARY
UNITED STATES v. RUIZ-GAXIOLA:
SETTING THE STANDARD FOR
MEDICATING DEFENDANTS
INVOLUNTARILY IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government could not
medicate a defendant involuntarily for the sole purpose of rendering the
defendant competent to stand trial. 1 The court relied on the Sell test in
making its determination. 2 In Sell v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court established a four-pronged test for determining whether a
court should grant a request to medicate a defendant involuntarily. 3 A
court may not grant such a request unless the government shows that (1)
an important government interest is at stake in prosecuting the defendant
to be medicated, (2) medicating the defendant involuntarily will
significantly further the important government interest, (3) medicating
the defendant involuntarily is necessary to further the important
government interest, and (4) the involuntary medication of the defendant
is medically appropriate. 4 The Ninth Circuit held that because the
government failed to establish the facts necessary to satisfy all four

1

United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id.; see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).
3
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.
4
Id.
2

387
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prongs of the Sell test by clear and convincing evidence, the district court
erred in authorizing the involuntary medication of the defendant. 5
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 27, 2006, Vicente Ruiz-Gaxiola (Ruiz) was arrested for
illegally reentering the United States after being deported. 6 If found
guilty of the charge, Ruiz faced the sentencing guidelines’ suggested
imprisonment of 100 to 125 months. 7
After Ruiz’s arrest, his attorney moved for an evaluation of Ruiz’s
competency to stand trial. 8 Ruiz was subsequently diagnosed with
Delusional Disorder, grandiose type, 9 and found incompetent to stand
trial. 10 The magistrate judge committed Ruiz to the custody of the
Attorney General, whereupon he was transferred to the Federal Medical
Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC”), and evaluated to determine
the potential for his competence to be restored. 11 After his evaluation at
FMC, where Ruiz’s diagnosis was confirmed, the staff members who
evaluated him recommended that Ruiz take psychotropic medication. 12
He refused. 13 In a written report, the evaluators requested that the court
issue an order allowing FMC to medicate Ruiz against his will for the
sole purpose of restoring his competency for trial. 14 The report
acknowledged the need to prove all of the Sell factors, and explained
why, in the opinion of the evaluators, all of the factors were satisfied. 15
Because the Ninth Circuit disfavors Sell orders, 16 the magistrate
judge first sought to answer the government’s request on an alternative
basis and ordered a Harper hearing 17 to determine whether Ruiz was
5

Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 707.
Id. at 688.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at n.1 (“The 2006 Merck Manual of Medicine describes Delusional Disorder as a
distinct disorder ‘characterized by non-bizarre delusions (false beliefs) that persist for at least 1
[month], without other symptoms of schizophrenia.’ The Manual describes the disorder as
uncommon, and with respect to the grandiose subtype, notes that ‘the patient believes he has a great
talent or has made an important discovery.’”).
10
Id. at 689.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. (citing United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005)).
17
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) held, inter alia, that
medically treating a prisoner against his or her will does not violate substantive due process if the
6
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gravely disabled or a danger to himself or others.18 Ruiz was found to be
neither. 19 The magistrate judge then held a Sell hearing. 20
Two co-authors of the FMC report testified as expert witnesses for
the government. 21 First was Dr. Mark Cheltenham, a staff psychiatrist
who had been at FMC for seventeen months. 22 As of the date of the
hearing, Dr. Cheltenham had not been board certified in psychiatry. 23
Second was Carlton Pyant, a forensic psychologist who had been with
the Bureau of Prisons for fifteen years. 24 Dr. Cheltenham met with Ruiz
four or five times for a total of approximately three hours, and Dr. Pyant
met with Ruiz at least seven times. 25 The expert witness for the defense,
Dr. Robert Cloninger, was a psychiatrist with extensive credentials
ranging from a private psychiatric practice to professorship at
Washington University, and he had published hundreds of articles and
several books on the subject of psychiatry. 26 Dr. Cloninger met with
Ruiz via video teleconference for two hours and ten minutes. 27 In
addition, he reviewed Ruiz’s competency report, the FMC report, and the
Harper hearing report. 28
Both sides agreed that Ruiz was incompetent to stand trial, but they
disagreed as to whether he should be medicated against his will. 29 At the
hearing, Dr. Cheltenham stated that he believed the proposed use of the
drug Haldol Decanoate 30 as a treatment was substantially likely to restore
Ruiz’s competence and unlikely to cause side effects in the short period
of time that the drug would be administered for the trial. 31 He also
opined that, because Ruiz was refusing to take any medication, there was
no less-intrusive alternative available and that the treatment was
medically appropriate. 32 Conversely, Dr. Cloninger opined that use of

prisoner is found to be a danger to himself or herself or others. A Harper hearing evaluates evidence
to make such a determination.
18
Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 689 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. 210).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 690.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 689.
31
Id. at 690.
32
Id.
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the drug would likely exacerbate Ruiz’s delusions rather than restore
competency, and that he would immediately face the risk of serious and
possibly irreversible side effects from the medication. 33 He further
stated that the proposed treatment was not medically appropriate and that
a less-intrusive alternative was available in the form of a “trusting
therapeutic alliance.” 34
On June 3, 2008, the magistrate judge issued a Report and
Recommendations. 35 He found that the government had met its burden
of proving each of the Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence, and
he recommended that the district court grant the government’s request. 36
Ruiz filed objections with the district court and requested a stay in the
event that the district court followed the magistrate judge’s
recommendation. 37
On August 19, 2008, the district court denied Ruiz’s objections and
adopted the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
and authorized the government to medicate Ruiz against his will. 38 The
court stayed the order for thirty days to allow Ruiz to appeal the
decision. 39 On September 17, 2008, the Ninth Circuit stayed the order of
the district court pending resolution of the appeal. 40
II.

NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by recognizing that the
United States Supreme Court has, on three occasions, “recognized a
liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs” 41 and has
only allowed involuntary medication in “highly-specific factual and
medical circumstances.” 42

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 691.
41
Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
42
Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691 (citing United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130,
1136 (9th Cir. 2005)).
34
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STANDARD OF PROOF

When the Supreme Court decided Sell, it did not explicitly set forth
the standard of proof that must be met by the government to establish the
Sell factors, nor had the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of standard of
proof in this context. 43 Due in part to the “particularly severe”
interference with a person’s liberty, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Sell
inquiries “call[] for a more stringent burden of proof.” 44 Agreeing with
every other circuit that has addressed the issue, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the government must prove all prongs of the Sell test by
clear and convincing evidence. 45
B.

SELL TEST

In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court established a fourpronged test to determine when it is constitutionally permissible to
administer antipsychotic medications against a person’s will. 46 The
Court announced that the factors should not be treated as a balancing
test; rather, the government must prove each factor independently by
clear and convincing evidence. 47
The first factor, the government’s interest in prosecuting Ruiz, was
primarily a legal issue. 48 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district
court’s ruling on the first factor de novo. 49 The remaining three factors
required the court to consider the testimony of expert witnesses and
evaluate medical evidence. 50 Thus, those factors were reviewed for clear
error. 51 Clear error occurs when, “although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 52

43

Id.
Id. at 692.
45
Id.; see United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814 (4th Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Payne, 539 F.3d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir.
2008); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387
F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004).
46
Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691; see Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.
47
Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691.
48
Id. at 693.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1260 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
44
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Whether Important Government Interest Is at Stake

The first prong of the Sell test requires that the government prove it
has an “important government interest” in prosecuting the defendant. 53
When determining whether a government interest is important, the court
weighs several considerations, with each case evaluated on its own
distinct facts. 54 There are circumstances in which particular facts will
lessen an otherwise important government interest. 55 For example, if a
defendant refuses to be medicated and as a result has been confined for a
period of time as long as or longer than the sentence recommended for
the offense for which he or she is charged, the government’s interest in
forcing that defendant to be medicated and brought before the court to
stand trial would be diminished. 56 The court uses the sentencing
guideline range as a starting point to determine whether a crime is
serious enough to satisfy this first prong. 57
Here, because of Ruiz’s extensive criminal history, the guidelines
suggested a sentence of 100-125 months. 58 In addition, the fact that Ruiz
was arrested just fourteen months after he was released from prison
served to tip the balance toward finding an important government
interest. 59 Although there appeared to be no possibility that Ruiz would
be subject to a civil confinement based on his mental illness, he had been
incarcerated for more than forty-seven months since his arrest. 60
However, the court noted, because of the length of Ruiz’s suggested
sentence, he would still be subject to an additional fifty-three to seventyeight months behind bars. 61 The court also considered the likelihood
Ruiz would reenter the country again illegally. 62 Because of his mental
condition, Ruiz believed God wanted him to be in the United States. 63
Although the court declined to address whether this circumstance would
make prosecution of Ruiz more or less important, the court, for purposes
of this case, “assume[d]” that this prosecution was an important

53

Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003)).
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 694 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 919 (9th Cir. 2008)).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 695.
62
Id.
63
Id.
54
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government interest. Therefore, the district court did not err in
determining that the government proved the first prong of the Sell test. 64
2.

Whether Involuntary Medication Will Further Government Interest

Under the Sell test, the second prong requires that the government
prove that “‘involuntary medication will significantly further’ its interest
in prosecuting the defendant for the charged offense.” 65 This prong has
two parts: (1) “that administration of the drugs is substantially likely to
render the defendant competent to stand trial,” and (2) “that
administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects
that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist
counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial
unfair.” 66 After hearing testimony from both the government’s and the
defendant’s experts, the magistrate judge set forth his findings in his
Report and Recommendations. 67 He concluded that the treatment
proposed by the government was
designed to reduce Defendant’s delusions, restore normal thought
processes, improve cognitive functioning in the courtroom and enable
Defendant to assist his attorney. Consequently, the medication is
substantially likely to render Defendant competent to proceed to trial
and substantially unlikely to produce side effects that would interfere
with Defendant’s ability to assist his attorney or that would be harmful
to him. 68

The Ninth Circuit emphatically disagreed with the magistrate judge’s
reasoning that because a treatment is designed to do something means
that it will do what it was designed to do.69 The second prong requires
that the government prove what its treatment is substantially likely to do
(and what it is not substantially likely to do, i.e., cause dangerous side
effects); thus, proving only what it was designed to do is insufficient. 70
The government must prove that the treatment is substantially likely to
restore competency. 71
The Ninth Circuit also found that the magistrate judge failed to
64

Id.
Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003)).
66
Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181).
67
Id. at 695-96.
68
Id. at 696 (quoting magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
65
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make any findings of fact as they pertained to the second prong. 72 In
addition, the court noted that the district court failed to comply with
procedural safeguards that are required when a person’s liberties are at
stake. 73 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that such a failure on the part of
the district court, in and of itself, would prevent it from upholding the
district court’s involuntary medication order. 74 In some cases, remand at
that point would be appropriate to allow the district court to make the
necessary findings of fact. In this case, however, a review of the record
convinced the court of appeals the district court on remand would not be
able to make any findings that would support a conclusion that the
government had satisfied the second prong. 75
Reviewing the record, the Ninth Circuit considered two questions
that were vigorously disputed. 76 First, the court considered whether the
use of antipsychotic drugs is a clinically accepted treatment for
Delusional Disorder. 77 Second, the court evaluated whether a 2007 study
conducted at FMC establishes that involuntary medication of detainees
with Delusional Disorder restores competency. 78
As to the first issue, the government evaluators in Ruiz’s FMC
evaluation report opined that the use of antipsychotic drugs is the
accepted and appropriate treatment for individuals with Delusional
Disorder. 79 However, the government offered only Ruiz’s evaluation
report without any published authority in support of its contentions. 80 In
contrast, the defense expert, Dr. Cloninger, testified that there is no
clinical consensus as to whether Delusional Disorder should be treated
with antipsychotic medications. 81 The defense supported its contention
by introducing into evidence the Merck Manual of Medicine (considered
to be the medical equivalent to Black’s Law Dictionary), which states
that the established treatment for Delusional Disorder is “an effective
physician-patient relationship” and that there is insufficient data
available to support the use of drugs in the treatment. 82
The
government’s expert witness, Dr. Cheltenham, later admitted there was
72

Id.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 697.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. (quoting THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1573 (Mark H. Beers et
al. eds., 18th ed. 2006)).
73

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/7

8

Cruz: United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola
CRUZ (FORMATTED).DOC

2011]

UNITED STATES v. RUIZ-GAXIOLA

5/5/2011 5:10:13 PM

395

“no explicit practice guideline or consensus on . . . how to treat patients
with delusional disorder, and particularly as it regards medications.” 83
Based on the conflicting testimony, the court found that there was no
support for the contention that the proposed treatment would be likely to
restore Ruiz to competency. 84
As to the second question, the government offered the results of a
study completed at FMC in which twenty-two incompetent, non-violent
pretrial detainees with Delusional Disorder were treated with
antipsychotic medications. 85 Dr. Cheltenham testified that seventy-seven
percent of the treated detainees were restored to competency; 86 however,
the defense argued that the FMC study lacked untreated control subjects
and cited other studies that had similar results without the use of
antipsychotic medications. 87 In addition, Dr. Cloninger pointed out that
the subjects in the study were not being involuntarily medicated. 88 In his
opinion, the involuntary medication of Ruiz was likely to worsen his
condition because he would fight back due to a feeling of
powerlessness. 89
The Ninth Circuit found that the government mainly “relied on the
effects of antipsychotic medication on delusional thought processes
generally, rather than evidence specific to the particular mental illness
from which Ruiz suffers.” 90 The court further noted that the expertise
and knowledge of Dr. Cheltenham, the expert for the government,
regarding Delusional Disorder was far outweighed by that of Dr.
Cloninger, the defense expert. 91 As a result, the court concluded that
“the generalized statements and unsupported assertions of the
government experts, when contrasted with the specific and authoritative
rebuttal evidence presented by the defense,” were insufficient to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment of
involuntary medication was substantially likely to restore competency. 92
Thus, the court held that the district court erred in finding that the
government proved the second prong by clear and convincing

83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. at 698.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 698-99.
89
Id. at 699.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 699-700.
92
Id. at 701.
84
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evidence. 93 Because the court found against the government on the first
part of the prong, it did not address the second part of the prong, whether
the treatment was substantially unlikely to cause dangerous side effects. 94
3.

Whether Involuntary Medication Is Necessary to Further
Government Interest

Under the third prong of the Sell test, the government must prove
that the proposed treatment is necessary to further the important
government interest and that “any alternative, less intrusive treatments
are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results.” 95 In order for the
court to find that involuntary medication is necessary it is a natural
prerequisite that the second prong first be satisfied. 96 Here, the fact that
the government failed to prove that medicating Ruiz against his will
would further an important government interest meant it would be
impossible to then prove that involuntarily medicating Ruiz was
necessary to accomplish that important government interest. 97
Nevertheless, the court went on to evaluate the evidence as if the second
prong of the Sell test had been established. 98
The defense favored a treatment that was less intrusive than
medication and suggested a “therapeutic alliance” between a private
psychiatrist and Ruiz. 99 The magistrate judge found that this alternative
was unlikely to achieve the same results as the government’s proposed
involuntary medication. 100 The magistrate reasoned that the defense
expert’s proposal was based on only two hours and ten minutes of
teleconference interviews while the government experts spent
substantially more time with Ruiz. 101 The Ninth Circuit was troubled by
this reasoning because of the common nature of cases that are evaluated
under the Sell test; defendants are generally detained in federal medical
centers, and therefore, government experts are far more likely to have
more time with the defendant. 102 Thus, the amount of time spent with
the defendant should not have been the main basis for such a finding. 103
93

Id.
Id. at 701 n.12.
95
Id. at 701 (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003)).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 701-03.
99
Id. at 701.
100
Id. at 702.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
94
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However, based on other factors, specifically that Ruiz did not believe he
was mentally ill, did not believe that he needed any medication or
treatment, and believed there was a conspiracy against him, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that it would be unlikely that he would voluntarily
participate in a therapeutic treatment as proposed by the defense. 104
Thus, the court determined that if the government had established the
second prong, it would also have established the third prong. 105
4.

Whether Administration of the Medication Is Medically Appropriate

Reflecting the importance of the liberty interests at issue, the fourth
and final prong of the Sell test requires that the government prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is “in the
patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.” 106 The
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the Supreme Court’s use of the word
“patient,” in this prong, as opposed to “defendant” in the other prongs,
demonstrates that courts must consider the long-term medical
consequences to the patient rather than the short-term interests of the
government. 107
The magistrate judge found that the government satisfied this prong
of the Sell test. 108 The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and explained
that the magistrate judge had erroneously relied on his flawed analysis in
prong two to find that the government satisfied its burden in prong
four. 109 The Ninth Circuit explained that, while the second prong
requires that the treatment be substantially likely to restore competence
and substantially unlikely to cause harmful side effects, the fourth prong
requires that the court “consider all of the medical consequences of the
proposed involuntary medication, including those consequences that may
. . . result in long term side effects.” 110 Both the prosecution and defense
agreed that Haldol could cause harmful side effects such as tardive
dyskinesia, described as a “very disfiguring side effect that can affect
muscles anywhere in the body.” 111 The experts testified that tardive
dyskinesia can be reversed in up to fifty percent of patients if it is

104

Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 703.
106
Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003), and adding emphasis).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 703-04.
109
Id. at 704.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 705.
105
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detected early. 112 The government argued that the treatment would be
administered only for the duration of the trial and that the side effects
would be unlikely to occur in that short period of time. 113 It was
undisputed, however, that if Ruiz did not continue to take the
medications indefinitely, the positive effects of the drugs would end. 114
Thus, the court noted, from Ruiz’s standpoint, the benefit of being
competent for the short period of trial and then being returned to a
delusional state was not worth even the small risk of a disfiguring side
effect. 115 The court again stated that the government failed to offer any
evidence that Haldol would render Ruiz competent for the duration of
trial preparation and trial. 116
For the above reasons, the court found that the district court erred in
concluding that the government proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the proposed treatment was in Ruiz’s best medical interest in light of
his medical condition. 117
III. HOW OTHER CIRCUITS HAVE ADDRESSED THE SELL FACTORS
Since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Sell, several
circuits have been faced with the task of determining whether the
government successfully proved all four of the Sell prongs when it
requested an order to involuntarily medicate a defendant. 118 Although all
circuits to date have agreed that the standard of proof should be that the
government must prove each and every prong by clear and convincing
evidence, what constitutes sufficient proof for each prong is still subject
to disagreement. 119
There seems to be general agreement among the circuits when it
comes to the first prong of the Sell test. 120 Overwhelmingly, courts
112

Id.
Id. at 706.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Fazio,
599 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005).
119
Compare, e.g., Fazio, 599 F.3d at 841 (accepting the testimony of a psychiatrist (a medical
doctor) who had worked closely with the defendant and whose opinion addressed the specific
defendant’s medical condition), with Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1114-15 (finding that the testimony of a
psychologist (a Ph.D.) stating that the proposed treatment was “[t]he treatment of choice for a
psychotic disorder” was sufficient).
120
See Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840; Grape, 549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547; Bradley, 417
F.3d at 1116.
113
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agree, and Sell itself seems to confirm, that prosecuting a serious crime
is, in and of itself, an important government interest. 121 To prove that the
crime in the case at issue is serious, the general opinion is that the
sentencing guidelines are the appropriate place to start. 122 The courts do
not specifically elaborate, but the obvious implication is that the longer
the suggested sentence, the more likely the court would be to hold that a
given crime is serious. 123 The Sixth Circuit added that violence,
although an important factor, is not required to find that a crime is
serious. 124 The Sixth Circuit also found that the crime need not be one
against person or property to be considered serious. 125 After considering
the sentencing guidelines, the Third Circuit noted that courts should also
consider mitigating factors before determining that the involuntary
medication of the defendant is an important government interest. 126
Although different circuits specify different considerations, there does
not seem to be a conflict among the circuits on the first prong of the Sell
test. 127
There is less agreement among the circuits when it comes to their
analysis of the evidence required for the second prong of the Sell test. 128
The second prong requires the government to prove that the proposed
treatment is substantially likely to render the defendant competent while
substantially unlikely to cause side effects that would hinder the
defendant’s ability to aid in his or her defense. 129 As to part one, in cases
where there was an actual medical history of the defendant responding
well to the proposed medications, the analysis was brief, as may be
expected. 130 In cases where the defendant has no personal history of
using medication, however, courts have given great deference to
statistical data as explained by government experts. 131 In trusting the
opinion of a government expert, one circuit went so far as to find that the
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See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840; Grape,
549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547; Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1116.
122
See, e.g., Grape, 549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547.
123
See, e.g., Grape, 549 F.3d at 600; Green, 532 F.3d at 547.
124
Green, 532 F.3d at 548.
125
Id. at 551.
126
Grape, 549 F.3d at 600.
127
See, e.g., Grape, 549 F.3d at 600-03; Green, 532 F.3d at 547-51.
128
Compare, e.g., United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2010) (providing very little
analysis of drug side-effects), with Green, 532 F.3d 538 (considering more thoroughly what the side
effects of the medications will be).
129
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
130
See Grape, 549 F.3d at 603-05; Green, 532 F.3d at 552-54.
131
See Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840-41; United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114-15 (10th
Cir. 2005).
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expert’s testimony that “[h]e was guardedly optimistic that
administration of antipsychotic medication would materially render aid
in restoring [the defendant] to competency,” was sufficient to support a
finding that the medication was “substantially likely” 132 to render the
defendant competent to stand trial. 133
As to the second part of prong two, courts vary widely as to how
much emphasis is placed on possible side effects. 134 Some courts appear
to pay little or no attention to this requirement, 135 while others have
placed significantly more weight on potential side effects. 136 Thus, there
has been little consistency among the circuits when it comes to prong
two of the Sell test.
In those circuits that have analyzed the third prong, the findings of
the courts varied greatly. 137 The Tenth Circuit simply concluded,
without any independent analysis, that absent clear error in the lower
court’s analysis of prongs two and four, involuntary medication of the
defendant was necessary to further the important government interest. 138
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, required proof from the
government that no less-intrusive alternative was likely to accomplish
the desired result. 139 There seems to be little agreement as to what is
necessary to satisfy prong three.
Finally, when considering the fourth Sell prong, whether the
proposed treatment is medically appropriate in light of a particular
defendant’s medical condition, circuits have again differed in what they
have accepted as proof. 140 The Eighth Circuit determined that the
government had met its burden with testimony from a psychiatrist who

132

See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1115 (emphasis added).
134
Compare, e.g., Fazio, 599 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2010) (providing very little analysis of drug
side-effects), with Green, 532 F.3d 538 (considering more thoroughly what the side effects of the
medications will be).
135
See Fazio, 599 F.3d at 840-41; Grape, 549 F.3d at 604-05; Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1115.
136
See United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2011); Green, 532 F.3d at
553-54.
137
Compare Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1117 (using its findings for prongs two and four to make its
decision about prong three), with Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1335-36 (requiring independent proof from the
government before making a decision about prong three).
138
Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1117.
139
Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1335-36.
140
Compare Fazio, 599 F.3d at 841 (holding that opinion testimony from a medical doctor
based on the defendant’s current medical condition satisfied the government’s burden as to the
fourth Sell factor), with Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1112 (holding that the government satisfied its burden
as to the fourth Sell factor with testimony from a clinical psychologist whose opinion was based on
the standard treatment for the kind of condition the defendant had, rather than on the specific
defendant’s current medical condition).
133
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had worked closely with the defendant. 141 In that case, the doctor
recommended the proposed treatment based on the defendant’s diagnosis
and stated that the treatment was appropriate in light of the specific
defendant’s current medical condition. 142 The Tenth Circuit seemed to
set a lower burden of proof for the government by determining that the
fourth prong was satisfied by testimony from a psychologist who
reported that “[b]ecause treatment with psychiatric medications is the
intervention of choice for [the defendant’s] condition, it is my opinion . .
. that treatment of his illness with psychiatric medications is medically
appropriate.” 143 In that case, the expert’s opinion was based on the
normally accepted treatment for the defendant’s disorder, but it did not
seem to take into consideration any specific health conditions of the
defendant. 144
Based on these vast differences in analyses, it would appear that the
appellate courts are unclear as to how exactly they should be analyzing
the Sell factors.
CONCLUSION
As compared to other circuits that have addressed a Sell challenge,
the Ninth Circuit gave a much more thorough and reasoned opinion as to
how it read the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court. By
establishing a standard of proof for Sell inquiries in Ruiz-Gaxiola, the
Ninth Circuit has provided lower courts with a clear guideline to evaluate
cases in which the government wishes to medicate non-violent,
incompetent defendants against their will solely for the purpose of
gaining competency for trial. 145 Although the Supreme Court had
previously laid out specific requirements for such challenges, it failed to
provide the standard by which the government must prove its case. 146
In addition, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of
addressing each and every prong of the Sell test. 147 The government
cannot rely on proof of one prong to establish another prong.148
Although there is some overlap among the prongs, and multiple prongs
can rely on similar facts, the purpose behind each prong is different and
141

Fazio, 599 F.3d at 841.
Id.
143
Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1112.
144
Id.
145
United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010).
146
Id. at 691; see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
147
Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 691.
148
Id. at 704.
142
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must be addressed separately. 149 The government, and the courts hearing
these cases, must be mindful of the fact that a person’s liberty is at stake
and that in the United States such a restraint requires a showing of
extreme circumstances. 150
In Ruiz-Gaxiola the Ninth Circuit found that the government fell
short of proving all four prongs of the Sell test by clear and convincing
evidence. 151 Specifically, the government failed to prove that the
proposed treatment – the involuntary medication of Ruiz with the drug
Haldol – was substantially likely to restore competence and was in
Ruiz’s best medical interest. 152 Because the district court erred in
finding to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
order authorizing involuntary medication of Vicente Ruiz-Gaxiola. 153
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